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Introduction 
Offhand references to the notion of the ‘Nordic model’ abound both within and without 
welfare research. As we will see in this paper, there certainly is something to this idea of the 
Nordic model, but at the same time it can be blinding to important intra-Nordic diversities in 
terms of social policies and social policy change. This working paper will go in-depth with intra-
Nordic diversities at the policy level in three select policy fields. The main focus will be on the 
changes of the most recent 25 years, but we will also take a broader historical look on the 
different pathways to relatively universal policy schemes.  To put the ‘Nordic model’ or ‘welfare 
regime’ in its European context, we will also briefly discuss the literature taking up the 
discussion of whether the Nordic countries really have distinctly universal welfare states.  
 
The three policy fields selected for this paper are pensions, health care and unemployment 
protection. These represent three main corners of the welfare state. Two of them, pensions 
and unemployment protection, concern income transfers, where transformative changes have 
taken place to different degrees in the Nordic countries. The last policy field, health care, 
concerns services rather than transfers, and has not experienced as radical changes from the 
perspective of universalism, even if significant reforms of the public sector and to some extent 
the public/private mix in service provision has been seen. As such, the three policy fields 
represent very well some main trends that we will review below before going in-depth with 
these specific policies.  
 
The notion that the Nordic countries represent something very distinct in terms of welfare and 
social development is nothing new. The idea of the Nordic ’model’ became something of a 
brand for these countries some decades after World War II (Petersen 2011). International 
interest has billowed back and forth since then. Arguably, this interest has picked up again in 
most recent years, perhaps with the realization that the idea of the very comprehensive and 
universal Nordic welfare states needs a service check. The special feature of the Economist 
(2013) on the Nordic ‘supermodel’ is a good example since the Nordic countries in this feature 
are lauded for reforming their welfare states and making them less generous or universal.   
 
Within comparative welfare research, investigations into welfare regimes firmly established the 
notion of a distinct Nordic welfare regime as epitomized by Esping-Andersens (1990) The Three 
Worlds of Welfare of Welfare Capitalism, yet efforts into welfare typologizing that included a 
Nordic or Scandinavian model can be traced back to Richard Titmuss (1974) and even earlier 
still (Powell & Barrientos 2011). Since then, there has been a long and exhaustive discussion 
regarding if and how the Nordic countries are distinct or how they have changed (Dølvik et. al. 
2014; Kananen 2014; Kvist et. al. 2012; Hvinden & Johansson 2007; Kangas & Palme 2005; 
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Kautto et. al. 2001).  Arguably, it easier to identify this ‘Nordicness’ on a range of social 
outcomes such as social trust (or other aspects of social cohesion), low poverty, low material 
deprivation and relatively low economic inequality, while the Nordic cases are often more 
diverse on the policy level. We could say that diverse policies (with some common 
denominators) have achieved very similar social outcomes. Yet, updated accounts of basic 
policy changes across both several Nordic country cases and policy fields at the same time are 
very difficult to come by. It is this lack in much of the most recent literature that we seek to 
make up for here.  
 
The Nordic model: Relatively universal or not? 
Generally, recent empirical enquiries continue to find support for a distinct Nordic world of 
welfare (Vis & Van Kersbergen 2014). The meta-review of Arts & Gelissens (2010), for example, 
includes 11 studies, of which the three Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden always cluster together, while Finland only ends up in the Nordic cluster with the three 
other countries in five of the studies. In some respects, Finland resembles an archetypal 
Continental-European or conservative welfare regime, and later we will see how Finland across 
all three policy areas included here looks like a universal/conservative hybrid.  
Naturally, findings across these studies differ according to whether the focus is on welfare 
regimes or more narrowly limited to welfare state policies and according to the indicators 
investigated. Consequently, the very general picture painted above of the continued existence 
of the Nordic sui generis can be nuanced a good deal if we focus solely on the policy level and 
differentiate between policy areas. Already at the turn of the millennium Kautto et. al. (2001) 
noted that various strands of literature now distinguished between at least five models of social 
insurance, five care models, four family policy models, for models of gender policy and three 
models of unemployment protection. This complexity can be reduced somewhat if we 
distinguish between the two main areas, namely services and income transfers.    
In the world of income transfers, comparative research has increasingly had difficulties 
identifying distinct differences that correspond to the classic threefold welfare regime 
distinction. The update and replication of de-commodification scores by Scruggs & Allen (2006) 
is a case in point. Across the three benefits in question (pensions, unemployment insurance and 
sickness) the results were somewhat ambiguous. For each benefit, it is possible to identify 
several countries with scores similar to or even higher than the Nordic cases. However, across 
all three benefit types (and thereby closer to the regime level), the three Scandinavian 
countries generally had the highest scores alongside the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. 
The three small Continental-European countries are often grouped alongside or close to the 
Nordic countries in the empirical welfare regime literature (Arts & Gelissen 2010).    
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Over time, the trend for many European countries Nordic and non-Nordic alike has been that 
income protection for the unemployed has become less generous and coverage has decreased 
(Ferragina et. al. 2013; Clasen & Clegg 2011). While there are significant a difference between 
the Nordic countries, unemployment protection has in general become less generous and less 
distinct compared to non-Nordic Europe (Kuivalainen & Nelson 2012; Hussain et. al. 2012). The 
Nordic benefit systems have become less efficient at combating relative poverty, although 
social minima in terms of benefit levels are often still relatively high (Hussain et. al. 2012). We 
will take a closer look at the dynamics behind these changes in the sections below. 
As regards welfare services, a classic critique of the early research into typologies was that 
services simply where ‘the forgotten half’ of the welfare state (Jensen 2011). At the same time, 
this is arguably where the Nordic countries were (and continue to be) most distinct. For 
example (and even though expenditure data do reveal much about qualitative difference in 
principles behind social policy in different countries) the Nordic countries have long spent 
relatively much on service areas such as health, education and care policies (ibid.). To some 
extent, much of Continental Europe has been catching up with Nordic Europe in this regard. 
The biggest differences are found in care and family policies and this is also where the Nordic 
countries are most unique. If we focus on family policies, however, there has been a marked 
tendency towards expansion of the role of the welfare state across most of Europe (Ferragina 
et. al. 2013). However, this should not necessarily be interpreted as welfare regime 
convergence in family and care policy. The policy expansion in continental Europe has often has 
taken place in ways that emphasize existing regime differences, for example via the extension 
of comprehensive cash-for-care schemes (Stoy 2014).         
We can try to summarize this discussion of Nordic vs. non-Nordic Europe. As regards services on 
the one hand, particularly family policy, we may in some instances speak of welfare state 
expansion in continental Europe. Still, these are the policy areas where the Nordic countries are 
most distinct, and welfare state expansion may happen in regime-dependent ways. On the 
other hand, income transfers, particularly unemployment protection, constitute an area where 
the Nordic countries seem to have converged towards the rest of Europe.  
 
The embryonic Nordic welfare states 
The history of the emerging Nordic welfare states began in the 1890s when all the Nordic 
countries introduced their first national social insurance laws. Sequencing, time spans and the 
level of economic development varied quite substantially between the countries. Denmark had 
the highest degree of industrialization and introduced first old age relief, then sickness 
insurance, work accident insurance and unemployment insurance in quick succession from 
1891 to 1907. Sweden and Norway had not introduced national policies in all of these areas 
until the mid-1930s. In the case of Sweden, it was because the country waited until 1934 to 
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adopt an unemployment insurance scheme, while Norway introduced national old age pensions 
in 1936. Finland was much less industrialized than the three Scandinavian countries, and 
introduced sickness insurance as the last of the four forms of insurance in 1963. The late 
emergence of national pension and sickness benefits in Finland are some of the main examples 
of how Finland has often been described as a laggard or Nordic ‘latecomer’ in terms of welfare 
state development (Kangas & Saloniemi 2013).   
 
Table 1: The first Nordic social insurance laws  
 1st social insurance 
law 
2nd social 
insurance law 
3rd social 
insurance law 
4th social 
insurance law 
 Law1 Year SD2 Law Year SD Law Year SD Law Year SD 
Denmark PI 1891 50 SI 1892 50 WA 1898 52 UI 1907 55 
Finland WA 1895 22 UI 1917 27 PI 1937 37 SI 1963 62 
Norway WA 1894 40 UI 1906 45 SI 1909 46 PI 1936 50 
Sweden SI 1891 47 WA 1901 50 PI 1913 55 UI 1934 61 
Source: Kangas & Palme (2005); Esping-Andersen & Korpi (1986).  
1) Law: SI = Sickness insurance; PI = Pension insurance; UI = Unemployment insurance; WA = 
Workers accident. 
2) SD = Rough reading of “socio-economic development” from Kangas & Palme (2005). The 
index is noted as based on “industrialization and laborization” but it is not explained any 
further.  
 
Insurance schemes were of course to be found in the Nordic countries before the introduction 
of national legislation. For example, some municipalities introduced the first public pension 
schemes for municipal workers, and various insurance schemes had emerged long before 
national legislation as voluntary, non-public schemes arranged by guilds, trade unions or 
employers. We will return to this in the various policy-specific sections below.  
 
It should be noted that beyond these first national social insurance schemes, various ‘poor 
laws’ were introduced much earlier in all the Nordic countries, yet they should of course not be 
likened with social assistance in the modern sense since penalization, stigmatization and loss of 
civil rights were very much features of the early poor laws (Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1986). 
Denmark introduced its first poor law in 1803, while the other three Nordic countries adopted 
their counterparts in 1845-1852. In terms of social assistance-laws, Denmark was once again 
the early mover in 1933, while the rest of the Nordics enacted their first laws in 1956-1965. 
Denmark was also a European latecomer, however, since the last element of loss of civil rights 
related to public support was not dismantled until 1961 (punitive loss of voting rights in some 
special cases).   
7 
 
 
Pensions: Nordic paths to universalism 
With their early pension schemes from 1889 and 1891, respectively, Germany and Denmark are 
commonly seen as the founding fathers of two very fundamental and different branches of 
both pension and welfare models (Ebbinghaus & Gronwald 2011; Palme 1990). Germany set off 
on the so-called ‘Bismarckian’ path, and adopted a mandatory and contributory system based 
on the principle of status maintenance or income replacement, divided according to different 
status groups, while Denmark took to the ‘Beveridge’ path (as it came to be known after World 
War II) based on citizenship (Ebbinghaus & Gronwald 2011). The Danish 1891-scheme was not 
at all universal but rather residual in the way that it was strictly means-tested and partly was an 
attempt to remove the elderly from the existing poor law and extend proper old age support. 
Despite the residual nature of the scheme, the citizenship principle enshrined in the scheme 
and the aim of combating poverty makes it easier than a Bismarckian scheme to convert to fully 
fledged universalism, something that also illustrates a form of kinship between the universal 
and residual welfare regimes (Beland et. al. 2014).  
 
Sweden in 1913 adopted its first national pension reform. Here, a basic pension was ensured 
for all retirees in the way that it combined fully funded, contributory pensions with means-
tested supplements. For this reason, it has been argued that it was the first piece of social 
legislation based on universalism (Anttonen & Sipilä 2012; Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1986). A 
contributory system was discussed in Denmark at the same time, but by the time a commission 
handed in its report in 1914, the Danish centre-left, which opposed the idea, had gained the 
majority. Norway in 1936 adopted its first national pension scheme, which was similar to the 
Danish system because it was tax-financed and means-tested, while Finland in 1937 set out on 
an initially more ‘Bismarckian’ path with a fully-fledged compulsory and defined-contribution 
based pension scheme for all workers (Kangas & Luna 2012; Kuhnle 1987). The Finnish scheme, 
however, also included a means-tested supplement and was more in line with the Swedish 
system (Kautto 2012).    
 
The various schemes all evolved into universal old-age pensions in different ways, but the 
timing was similar. Sweden turned its basic pension into a PAYG-system without any means test 
in 1948 with the same flat-rate benefit for all pensioners (Lindquist 2011). Denmark and 
Norway adopted universal basic pensions reforms in 1956 and 1957, respectively (Goul 
Andersen 2011a; Kuhnle 1987). Finland also made a switch from its more Bismarckian path to a 
completely universal and flat-rate benefit in 1956 (Kangas & Luna 2011). Originally, the reform 
agreed between the Social Democrats and the Agrarians did preserve the principle of status-
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maintenance through income-related pensions for those in employment, but that was 
abandoned by the Agrarians in the final vote (Kangas & Luna 2011).  
 
The switch towards universalization did not happen as abruptly as the impression might be 
from the above. The early, non-universal pension Nordic pension schemes all had their 
incremental steps towards the citizenship-principle enshrined in universalism. In 1922, 
Denmark adopted fixed rather than discretionary entitlements, a further step away from early 
poor relief (Petersen 2006). Benefit levels were not uniform or national, however, since there 
were different scales for different parts of the country, and some pensioners, particularly 
singles, experienced lower benefits following national legislation. In 1918, Sweden restricted 
the possibility of occupational groups who already had their own occupational schemes to opt 
out of the national scheme, and all groups including government employees were included in 
the system from 1937. At the same time, the pension became more tax-financed (Lindquist 
2011). Finland also expanded coverage of its public scheme, for example by including the 
disabled (Kautto 2012).  
 
Towards multitiered pension systems 
The next step and critical juncture in pension evolution, not only specific to Nordic countries, is 
whether an adequate earnings-related pillar is added to the pension system to maintain 
incomes within the context of the economic development of the post-World War II period 
(Ebbinghaus & Gronwald 2011).  
 
Outside the public pension system, the earliest occupational pension schemes came into 
existence in the Nordic countries already before the 20th century. The very earliest non-public 
pensions in the private sector were not sector-wide agreements, but a result of unilateral 
decisions by employers. More occupational and sector-wide agreements followed around the 
same time as the era of the first public reforms covered above, but coverage remained low. 
Public sector employees usually had high coverage, while things were quite different in the 
private sector, particularly among blue-collar workers (Goul Andersen 2011a; Lindquist 2011; 
Kangas & Luna 2011). In Finland, for example, only about 20% of the workforce was covered by 
occupational pensions towards the end of the 1950s. In other words, there seemed to be a 
need for a statutory solution to ensure adequate pensions for all wage earners.  
 
The Nordic countries diverged somewhat on this issue, particularly in the case of Denmark, 
where policymakers failed to introduce an adequate earnings-related tier, which partly led to 
the crowding-in of non-public pension solutions (Kangas et. al. 2010). In Denmark it only to a 
limited degree happened as ‘pressure from below’, since the final push towards crowding-in 
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happened when government and municipalities agreed together on expanding labor market 
pensions, as will be explained below.  
 
In Sweden, discussions began already in the 1940s about complementing the public basic 
pension with a more adequate solution for wage earners since the existing occupational 
pensions only covered most segments of the labor market to a very limited degree. In 1960, 
Sweden adopted a defined benefit or earnings-related PAYG-based supplementary pension, the 
ATP (Lindquist 2011). Norway adopted a similar scheme, which also bore the name ATP, in 
1967. Already in 1960 such a scheme was agreed through collective bargaining, but it became 
legislated seven years later (Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1986). 1967 was also the year when  
Norway finally adopted its long-discussed National Insurance scheme, which integrated various 
universal-coverages insurance schemes, increasing old-age pensions (Kuhnle 1987)  
 
In Finland, a different sort of agreement of was reached in 1961 with a coalition outside the 
government (once again, the Agrarians in the government were against an earnings-related 
tier). This made employment-related pensions statutory and compulsory within the private 
sector (Kangas & Luna 2011). Public sector employees had had their own funds for nearly a 
century, but were later homogenized into two new funds in 1964, one for municipal employees 
and another for state employees. Farmers and self-employed were included in the statutory 
provisions in 1974, but also with their own two pension funds. In this way, the Finnish ATP-
equivalent became one marked by sectoral divides. This made the Bismarckian legacy in Finland 
clear once again, as did arguably the fact that the earnings-related pensions had no formal 
ceiling (unlike the Swedish and Norwegian ATP-schemes) (Kangas et. al. 2010).    
 
The story is wholly different in Denmark, where no adequate earnings-related pension scheme 
was added to the public pension system. A new and fully funded pension benefit which bore 
the ATP-name was adopted in 1964.  The benefit was based not on previous income, however, 
but on the number of contribution years with contributions being fixed. (Petersen & Petersen 
2012) The scheme was partly a compensation for a government intervention in collective 
negotiations and a crisis package (Goul Andersen 2011a). Furthermore, the Danish labor 
movement was divided on the issue, and the fact that the Danish basic pension was more 
generous than elsewhere also hampered the advocacy of an adequate ATP-solution. This meant 
that the Danish public pension system in terms of replacement rates was more generous for 
low work incomes relative to the other Nordic counterparts, but somewhat less generous for 
average work incomes and markedly so for high incomes (Ploug & Kvist 1994). The addition of a 
truly earnings-related supplement was heavily debated in the second half of the 1960s but 
never adopted.  
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The fact that the Danish ATP was so limited (and not earnings-related) meant that it did by itself 
not make a very significant difference for most pensioners. This contributed to the later crowd-
in of occupational labor market pensions. The number of cross-sector pension funds increased 
rapidly. By 1986, for example, 34% of white collar workers in the private sector and 48% of their 
counterparts in the public sector had such pensions (Goul Andersen 2011a). A mandatory 
system, which would perhaps have been not entirely unlike the Finnish, was suggested by the 
Danish federation of trade unions, but the right-wing government and employers disagreed. A 
corporative commission on pensions was appointed in 1988, and one year later government 
and municipalities together expanded labor market pensions to all municipal workers who did 
not already have one. This was the watershed, and it set the pace the subsequent expansion in 
the private sector. 
 
This is a contrast to the Finnish case, where the public pension system without any benefit 
ceiling can be argued to have effectively hampered the development of private or collectively 
negotiated solutions (Kangas & Luna 2011). In Finland, occupational pensions outside the 
compulsory pensions only cover around 20% of the labor force and individual, private pensions 
about 15% (Kangas & Saloniemi 2013). On the other hand, Kangas & Luna (2011) also 
acknowledge that the Finnish system is situated in a gray area between public and private, 
since it has enshrined the sectorally divided and privately run occupational and earnings-related 
pensions as statutory and compulsory. In the Danish case, Goul-Andersen (2011) argues that 
the Danish labor market pensions constitute a quasi-universal solution, even if they were not 
adopted through legislation, because of the way they have been institutionalized in collective 
labor market agreements.  This illustrates the blurry boundaries in Nordic multipillar pension 
systems. However, when we speak of ‘near universal coverage’ because of collective 
agreements and the fact that labor market pensions have also become standard for work places 
outside agreements, we should remember that there are those who spend a significant share of 
their working life outside the labor force. In 2008, 78% of the Danish labor force were included 
in labor market pensions (Goul Andersen 2011a).   
 
Non-public labor market pensions through collective agreements did certainly also emerge as 
significant pillars within the pension system in Sweden.  In Sweden, for example, collectively 
agreed labor markets pensions also have near-universal coverage, but contributions are low1 
because public pensions are much more adequate (and contributions towards public pensions 
                                                          
1 The contribution rates for the four major collectively negotiated pension funds (two for public and two for private 
employees) are all of them at 4.5% of the wage (Lindquist 2011). An exception is found in the two private sector 
schemes, where wage amounts above a level of 7.5 times the so-called base amount has a contribution rate of 
30% (the base amount was 51.100 SEK in 2010), a level which corresponds roughly to the average Swedish wage 
according to Eurostat (2013).  Nevertheless, this still makes for a very low total contribution rate for most workers. 
In Denmark, by contrast, contributions vary between 12 and 18% of wages (Goul Andersen 2011). 
11 
 
very significant). In Norway, the system was until recently overwhelmingly based on the public, 
PAYG pension system. For this reason, pension savings were also quite low compared to the 
other countries. In 2011, pension savings were equivalent to 7% of GDP in Norway (according to 
OECD-estimates), while it was 64% and 84% in Sweden and Finland respectively (Goul Andersen 
& Hatland 2014).  In Denmark it was an extreme 187%. Such massive pension savings can be 
found nowhere else in the world.  
 
Today, the Nordic pension systems have all emerged as multitiered pension systems, although 
the degree to which this equals evolved multipillar systems varies. As we shall see below, this 
has happened alongside very significant reforms of a primary concern from a social citizenship 
perspective, namely the basic and universal public pensions. Universalism as a policy principle 
in its most strict sense can no longer be found in Finland, Norway or Sweden. Here, the basic 
pensions are now completely negative-selective (income-tested), while Denmark has 
maintained universalism, but also increased the degree of positive selectivism (income-tested 
supplements) significantly.   
 
In Sweden, political discussions about the long-term sustainability of the pension system began 
already in the 1980s (Berglund & Esser 2013; Lindquist 2011). In 1994, a committee with 
members from all parliamentary parties agreed on a report to overhaul the pension system, but 
prolonged political negotiations meant that the final reform was not decided until 1998. The 
first tier of the public pension system was changed from a universal pension to a so-called 
‘guarantee pension’, a completely negative-selective pension benefit designed to benefit those 
with inadequate benefits and savings from other pension schemes (except the premium 
pension explained below). The guarantee pension is not means-tested against private pensions 
whether occupational or individual in order to induce private savings. The second, earnings-
related tier, now dubbed ‘income pension’, was changed to a notional defined contribution 
(NDC) pension scheme. The NDC system is predominantly PAYG-based, but mimics a funded 
DC-system in the sense that contributions are linked to ‘notional’ accounts which are used to 
calculate benefits adjusted by life expectancy at retirement. On top of this is the ‘premium 
pension’, which is funded and DC-based. The contribution rates are 16% for the NDC-scheme 
and 2.5% for the premium pension. This also illustrates why contributions for occupational 
pensions are much lower in Sweden than in Denmark, since contributions towards public, 
earnings-related pensions are so high. Retirement is flexible between 61-67 years, with income 
from the NDC-system spread out over the remaining (expected – by gender and age cohort) 
lifetime to induce late retirement.  
 
Effective from 2011, Norway reformed its pension system along some of the same lines as 
Sweden, with political deliberations taking place in 2001-2009. Norway also adopted a 
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negative-selective guarantee pension as the first tier. An important difference is that the 
benefit level of the Norwegian income pension, the second tier, is not DC-based. Instead, each 
individual will increase their pension income entitlements by 18.1% of annual income, which is 
adjusted each year by wage growth to secure real adequacy (Goul-Andersen & Hatland 2014; 
Hippe & Berge 2013). There is no public ‘premium pension’ as in Sweden either. On the other 
hand, it has since 2006 been mandatory for employers to adopt occupational, defined 
contribution plans with a minimum contribution of at least 2%, which is quite similar to the 
Swedish premium pension.  As in Sweden, retirement is flexible with incentives to retire late, 
but in this case the span is 62-75 years.  
 
In Finland, reforms of the earnings-related pensions were less radical. However, Finland 
abolished the universal basic amount of the national pension, whereby the pension became 
entirely income-tested, already in 1995 (Kautto 2012). This followed a series of const-
containment measures a few years before (which continued into the new millennium) (Kangas 
& Saloniemi 2013; Kangas & Luna 2011; Kangas et. al. 2010). Measures included weakening the 
indexation of benefits and lengthening the calculation period of pensionable wage from the last 
four to the last ten years of employment. Pension contributions were also shifted towards 
employees. In 2002-2005, the various private and public sector funds were subject to a series of 
reforms which abolished the target level of 60% replacement rate. Later retirement was 
incentivized by letting pension accrual rates increase with age and the adjustment of pensions 
by a life expectancy coefficient. However, the reforms also increased coverage somewhat by 
including more welfare benefits in accrual calculations (Kautto 2012).  
 
In 2011, Finland also added a ‘guarantee pension’ to ensure a higher minimum at the lower end 
of the income scale. This guarantee pension is income-tested against both the basic national 
pension and earnings-related pensions. Early 2014 saw another reform decision (effective from 
2017), the most important element of which is a gradual increase of pension age for birth 
cohorts born after 1995 (currently it is flexible around 63-68 years) (Finnish Centre for Pensions 
2014) 
 
While Denmark has not seen a complete removal of pension universalism as a policy principle, 
the national pension has certainly shifted towards being more income-tested than before. From 
1994, the amount of the universal benefit became roughly equal to its means-tested 
supplements, and in 2003 another means-tested supplement was added. Furthermore, the 
basic pension has since 1984 been means-tested against income from employment (Goul 
Andersen 2011a). 
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The shift away from universalism as a policy principle in the basic national pensions in Finland, 
Norway and Sweden is not as radical when seen through the perspective of benefit levels. For 
example, Kautto (2012:155) notes on the shift away from the universalism in 1995 in Finland 
that it was radical in principle, but that it was not “…really revolutionary in practice, as pension 
recipients still got more or less the same amount of pension”. The cost containment measures in 
preceding years (briefly noted above) had a much larger impact on benefits. Similarly, 
Blomqvist & Palme (2014:10) notes that in Sweden: “….the basic, flat-rate level of pension 
benefits guaranteed in the 1998-system is slightly higher than in the old system”. The various 
national minimum pensions achieve replacement rates which are in the end not that different 
for people with no contributory pensions, these being (in 2007) 56% in Denmark, 52% in 
Norway, and 46% in Sweden, but also a significantly lower 38% in Finland (Nososco 2009). 
However, we should bear in mind that these numbers are before the introduction of the new 
guarantee pensions in Norway and Finland (in Finland it is significantly higher than the old 
minimum as explained above).   
 
In conclusion, there has certainly been a shift towards multitiered pension systems in all the 
Nordic countries, but by different degrees and different paths. In terms of pension pillars, 
occupational, non-public pensions in Denmark (and Finland, if we consider the privately 
managed but compulsory occupational pensions) dominate the pension system much more 
than in Sweden and particularly Norway. These new and generally more DC-based schemes are 
by nature better adjusted towards changes in life expectancy (and then various political 
decisions such as life expectancy coefficients or increasing pension accrual rates by age also 
help in that regard).  More inequality among future pensioners would logically be expected 
since earnings-related pensions will matter much more for future pensioners since these new 
institutional shifts are still maturing. On the other hand, it is not necessarily a given fact, since 
statutory (or quasi-statutory in Denmark) earnings-related pensions and more selective basic 
pensions with high minima might complement each other well. In Denmark, for example, 
inequality is expected to decrease among pensioners and to be lower than among the 
population in general (Goul Andersen 2011a).  
 
The shift towards multitiered pensions has happened in quite different ways in the Nordic 
countries. However, whether it has happened within or without legislation does not always 
make an equally big difference in the end. All Nordic countries have broadly shifted in various 
ways to much more DC-based pension systems. These pensions have universal coverage for 
employees because of their compulsory nature, except for Denmark, where the 
institutionalization of labor market funds through collective agreements exclude a small 
minority of workers. Of course, in all the Nordic countries there is an issue for citizens who have 
had a weak connection to the labor market during working age. These people are much more 
14 
 
reliant on the by now more selective national minimum pensions, whether positive-selective (as 
in Denmark) or negative-selective (as in Finland, Norway and Sweden), but these all have 
relatively high minima.  
 
Unemployment insurance: Nordic rise and Norwegian demise of the Ghent 
model  
As shown in table 1, Norway and Denmark were the first Nordic countries to adopt national 
legislation on unemployment insurance in 1906 and 1907, respectively. Finland followed in 
1917, and this time Sweden was the laggard until it also adopted such a scheme in 1934. The 
Nordic countries all followed the so-called ‘Ghent model’, named after the Belgian city of Ghent 
in which it was first implemented in 1901, whereby the state subsidized voluntary insurance in 
unemployment funds connected to labor unions. France, however, was the first country to 
establish the principle at the national level in 1905 (Vandaele 2006). The Ghent system has 
survived only in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Belgium has retained a form of quasi-Ghent 
model, where the government also plays an important part in distributing benefits (ibid.  
           
Similar political forces were behind the first legislation in Denmark, Finland and Norway, where 
voluntary state-subsidized insurance managed by unions could reconcile conflicting interests of 
both agrarian parties and the Social Democrats. Edling (2006) emphasizes that one reason 
behind the much later legislation in Sweden was that the country did not yet have universal 
suffrage. The much more powerful estate owners and farmers in Sweden blocked attempts at 
similar legislation. Some skepticism also dominated unions in Sweden, however, and as in 
Norway and Finland they also thought that public subsidies were too low. Not unlike the 
previous experiences in the other Nordic countries, union funds were slow to register and in 
1940 only 11% of employees were in funds registered and subsidized by the state. No until 
1941, when state contributions increased significantly, among other things, did coverage begin 
to pick up speed (Berglund & Esser 2013; Edling 2006). 
 
When Norway first adopted the Ghent model, it seemed to be the right compromise in a 
situation where public solutions for unemployment benefits was increasingly needed, but 
where the perception also was that the state might not be able to take this on (Caroll 2005). 
The state simply built on the existing framework of union funds by simply subsidizing benefits. 
This framework was much more developed in Denmark, where unions around 1910 organized 
around 50% of the new industrial working class against 12% in Norway and 5% in Finland. Fund 
membership was also several timers higher in Denmark (Edling 2006).  
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Funds themselves still decided their own entitlement criteria and benefit levels also varied. 
Funds could distinguish between groups according to for example gender, income or 
contribution periods as they saw fit. This autonomy regarding entitlements and what 
constituted involuntary unemployment was later contested in Norway, especially from the right 
wing parties, in cases where funds granted benefits to workers who had quit their jobs 
voluntarily if employers cut wages or did not raise wages. It could appear as if the state 
supported union causes such as higher wages (Caroll 2005). In all three countries, however, it 
was established that workers could not receive benefits during strikes (Edling 2006).  
 
In the infancy of the Nordic Ghent systems, state subsidies were more generous in Denmark 
than in Norway and Finland, where subsidies were defined as a share of benefit expenses, 
rather than tied to members’ contributions as in Denmark (Edling 2006). On the other hand, the 
Danish set-up was more regressive, since it favored funds with low unemployment. In Norway, 
the union themselves opposed the 1906-reform in the first few years because state subsidies at 
one quarter of expenses were deemed too low and not sufficient compensation for the loss of 
autonomy (such as the requirement to open up for unorganized workers or separating strike 
funds from benefit funds).    
 
Such continuous conflicts coupled with the worsened economic situation in the 1920s after 
World War I contributed to the demise of the Ghent model in Norway in 1938. Union 
membership rates bloomed to 27% in 1920 following an increase in maximum benefits and 
duration period, but then dropped sharply again in the following years (Edling 2006). 
Norwegian unions had furthermore failed in boosting fund membership, and up until 1935 only 
a quarter of union members were enrolled in the funds (Carroll 2005). It seemed like the 
existing set-up was simply unable to cope with increasing unemployment. Coverage was too 
low, and the funds struggled with finances for those that were covered. Listening to sceptics 
that were also vocal within the unions, the Social Democratic government switched sides on the 
merits of voluntary insurance and finally abolished the system in order to replace it with 
compulsory insurance in 1938. The compulsory scheme increased insurance coverage tenfold, 
and was articulated as a triumph for the labor movement.  
 
Unemployment insurance in Finland faced many of the same problems, and on top of this came 
the domestic political turmoil inherited from the civil war in 1918. Only about 10% of workers 
were unionized by 1935, even lower than the 21% in Norway at the time, and as in Norway 
fund members were a clear minority (Edling 2006). Unions were continually accused of 
harboring revolutionary ambitions by the political right. Indeed, the far left continued to have 
strong influence after the civil war, and the Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions (SAJ), 
founded in 1907, was outlawed in 1930 after a Communist takeover (Carroll 2005). Its 
16 
 
successor, SAK, was led by Social Democrats, but nonetheless its leaders were often jailed on 
oftentimes fabricated charges of state treason. In 1931 and 1934, laws were enacted to protect 
the ‘industrial peace’ which among other things prohibied any links between funds and other 
organizations if they could throw into doubt the independence of the funds. This lead to the 
suspension of eight funds (out of 10) (Edling 2006; Carroll 2005).  Yet, Finland kept its 
commitment to the Ghent model despite a high degree of domestic political conflict and a 
Ghent model that evolved very slowly in the beginning. In contrast to Norway, the Finnish 
Social Democrats kept defending the system.  
 
Retrenchment of unemployment insurance 
After the adaption of Nordic Ghent models and the varying degrees of turmoil surrounding 
them (which lead to complete abandonment of the Ghent system in Norway), the schemes all 
became much more generous and encompassing in the post-World War II years.  Norway 
incorporated agricultural workers and a few other leftover occupational groups into its 
compulsory unemployment insurance in 1949, thereby making it universal (Kuhnle 1987). In 
1971, the scheme was incorporated into the National Insurance Scheme along with health 
insurance and work injury, marking the transition to a fully integrated system of various 
universal-coverage insurance schemes.  
 
For the other Ghent-based systems, the road towards towards universalization of voluntary 
insurance was a bit windier. One important step towards universalization in Denmark was the 
reform of state contributions to funds in 1958, which tied state contributions to expenses 
rather than income (Jørgensen 2007). This means that state contributions were increased and 
contribution levels greatly equalized across funds. This alleviated inequalities across funds 
greatly. Sweden also increased the level of financing in 1952 (Edling 2006). The final step in 
terms of financing is completely severing the link between unemployment levels and member 
contributions, which makes contributions uniform and fixed. In Denmark, this happened in 
1967-1970 as the state fully overtook the ‘marginal risk of unemployment’ (Goul Andersen 
2012). At the same time, the benefit ceiling was doubled in 1967, and the replacement rate 
jumped from 35% to 70% of an average wage (Jørgensen 2007). The reforms in 1967-1970 laid 
the institutional foundations for the modern setup of the benefit. The corresponding overhaul 
of unemployment insurance in Sweden happened in 1973 (SO 2006). In Finland, the 
foundations for the current unemployment insurance were laid with a reform in 1985 (Lilja & 
Savaja 1999).  
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These reforms also meant that member contributions became relatively negligible in the Nordic 
Ghent systems, at least until the 1990’s. Member contributions had shrunk to about to an 
estimated 5% of expenditures in Sweden and 20% in Denmark (Torp 1999). Contributions were 
more complicated in Finland, but the scheme also retained quite low member financing around 
5-10% in most of the 1990’s (Lilja & Savaja 1999).  In all three countries, employers also paid 
significant contributions, particularly in Finland (Lila & Savaja 1999; Torp 1999). From 1997, 
employer contributions were abolished in Denmark, however. Since then, there has been a 
trend towards increasing member contributions in all countries. In Sweden it has been most 
abrupt and radical, which we will return to below.  
 
In terms of generosity of the Nordic unemployment insurance schemes, a distinction can be 
made between the Finnish scheme on the other hand, which does not have a benefit ceiling, 
and the three Scandinavian benefit schemes, where benefit ceilings are in place (AK Samvirke 
2012; Torp 1999). Benefit ceilings in the Scandinavian countries has the effect that benefits de 
facto become flat-rate for much of the workforce (Clasen et. al. 2001). This means that the 
Finnish scheme is much more earnings-related, but from a lower baseline, which means that 
only for working incomes above 150% of the average wage is the Finnish scheme significantly 
more generous in terms of replacement levels2 (OECD 2014a).  
 
Benefit levels have been subject to some retrenchment, most significantly in Sweden. Firstly, 
Sweden like Denmark used to have a formal replacement rate of 90% below the ceiling, but this 
was lowered to 80% in 1993, and in 2007 this was reduced further to 70% and 65% for the 
unemployed after 200 and 300 days of unemployment, respectively (Goul Andersen 2012; 
Sjöberg 2011).  Furthermore, Sweden removed automatic adjustment of the benefit ceiling in 
1993 and it has only been adjusted upwards two times since then (by late 2014, the new Social 
Democratic-led government has proposed to raise the ceiling significantly, however). This 
development has gradually turned the Swedish benefit into a flat-rate scheme for more than 
80% of the insured unemployed (Berglund & Esser 2013; Sjöberg 2011) The benefit ceiling was 
previously relatively high in Sweden, but the combined effect of these benefit retrenchments 
has been a drop in net replacement rates for an average wage from 87% to 60% (ibid). This is 
one factor behind the expansion of private unemployment insurance in Sweden, which has 
become a standard item in collective agreements between employers and employees. In 2012, 
more than 53% of union workers or 37% of the labor force had private unemployment 
                                                          
2 At these high income levels, the Nordic schemes vary around 42-49% replacement rate, except for Sweden at 
34% (in 2012). At the lower rungs of the income scale with a working income at 67% of the average wage, 
Denmark is significantly more generous with a replacement rate of 84%, while the other Nordics schemes have 
replacement rates of 59-68%. The relative Danish generosity for low incomes is the result of a high formal 
replacement rate of 90% of previous income below the ceiling, while it is 80% in Sweden and 62.4% in Norway 
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insurance, which typically tries to raise total benefits to the 80% replacement rate-level 
(Rasmussen 2014).  
 
The Swedish retrenchment of the early 1990s was partly caused by a difficult economic 
recession at the time where unemployment rose from 2% to 8%. The situation was even worse 
in Finland, where declining benefit generosity was most evident following a big economic crisis 
in 1991-1994, where GDP dropped by 14% and unemployment rose from 3% to 18% (Heikkinen 
& Kuusterä 2001). Following the crisis of the early 1990s, price indexation of the base level of 
unemployment insurance was suspended until 2002 (Ervasti 2002). In 1992, the earnings-
related part of the benefit was also reduced, but this has later been raised back to the original 
benefit formula3 (Lila & Savaja 1999). As GDP and wages resumed normal growth (and Finland 
even entered a small economic boom), the level of unemployment benefits lagged greatly 
behind wage incomes (Lehtonen et. al. 2001). Unlike the other two Nordic Ghent countries, 
however, benefit levels have also been raised significantly in the new millennium. The earnings-
related part of the benefit formula was raised markedly in 2003 during the first 20-200 days of 
unemployment depending on the degree to which certain criteria regarding previous 
employment can be fulfilled4 (Uusitalo & Verho 2010). Furthermore, in 2005, a special 
‘transition allowance’ was enacted, which raises the benefit level even higher during 
participation in certain activation measures (Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2012)5. 
The benefit ‘floor’ or the base level of the benefit formula was raised markedly in 20126 (ibid.).  
 
Denmark did not to the same extent experience very noticeable cutbacks in benefit levels, yet 
the benefit ceiling has declined somewhat over time relative to wages because the indexation 
mechanism adopted in 1990 entails that benefits are not raised at the same rate as wages 
during times of high economic growth. This development has gradually turned the Danish 
benefit into a de facto flat-rate benefit for almost all workers (Goul Andersen 2011b). 
Replacement rates have dropped 10-15% since then for most workers, while a recent tax 
reform, which among other things reduces indexation of benefits in 2016-2023, will push net 
replacement rates further down by around 4%. In Norway, the single most important change to 
the benefit ceiling happened in 1989, when the ceiling (above which any additional income is 
disregarded for benefit calculations) was halved from twelve to six times the ‘base amount’, 
                                                          
3 The earnings-related part of the formula is that 45% of income above the benefit base level is replaced up to a 
certain point (close to the average wage), while 20% of income above this point is replaced. 
4 Rates for the earnings-related part of the benefit formula are raised to 57.5% and 35%, respectively, during initial 
employment if: 1) Previous employment lasted more than three years (raised benefit for 20 days), 2) Previous 
employment lasted more than 20 years and fund membership at least five years (raised benefit for 100 days).  
5 The transition allowance further raises the benefit rates explained in the footnotes above to 65% and 37.5%  
6 The raise was 120 EUR, equaling a 22% raise of the benefit floor.  
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which was one big step towards making the benefit both less generous and less dependent of 
previous income (Clasen et. al. 2001).  
 
Coverage of the contemporary Nordic unemployment insurance schemes has been relatively 
high, except for Finland. In the early 1990s, 70%-75% of the unemployed were covered in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, while it hovered around 50% in Finland (Torp 1999; Lila & 
Savaja 1999). The reason why coverage of the compulsory Norwegian scheme is not 100% is 
that duration is of course not unlimited while a work qualification criterion has to be fulfilled as 
elsewhere7. Coverage has since then declined somewhat, most noticeably in Sweden, where a 
steep decline from 2005 and onwards has placed coverage below 30% of the unemployed 
(Berglund & Esser 2013; Sjöberg 2011). The trend is so far less evident in Denmark and Finland. 
However, the long-term effect of lower benefit duration in Denmark is yet to be seen, and the 
case of Finland we should remember that coverage was already lower to begin with. The lower 
coverage of unemployment insurance (and greater reliance on social assistance) in Finland is 
one reason why means-tested social expenditure has traditionally made up a larger share of 
total social expenditure than in the other Nordic countries (Hvinden et. al. 2001) 
 
In Denmark, the move towards less generous coverage began by the middle of the 1990s, partly 
due to shortening of the benefit duration period in successive reforms. Maximum duration 
before 1993 was in reality up to nine years, but a 1993-reform capped duration at seven years. 
This was then lowered to five years in 1995, four years in 1998 and two years in 2010 (effective 
from 2012) (Goul Andersen 2012, 2011b). However, these very significant cut in benefit 
duration over several years has not had as dramatic an impact on coverage of the unemployed 
as one would perhaps expect (Goul Andersen 2011b). Coverage has been relatively stable due 
to the fact that the duration cuts of the 1990s happened in a context of falling unemployment. 
The recent changes (from four to two years coupled with a doubling of the re-qualification 
criteria) should have more significant long-term impacts. 
 
In Norway, the tightening of unemployment benefits was not as marked as in the other Nordic 
countries (Halvorsen 2002). Duration was actually extended in 1984 from 40 weeks (repeatable 
after 12 weeks without benefits) to 80 weeks (repeatable after 26 weeks without benefits 
(Halvorsen & Jensen 2004; Clasen et. al. 2001). In 1997, the no-benefit period was abolished 
and duration differentiated according income, so that incomes at more than twice the ‘base 
amount’ could receive benefits for 156 weeks and those below that income level had the right 
to 78 weeks. While this meant that work history now played a role for benefit duration, it was a 
                                                          
7 Duration is two years (one year for very low incomes). Qualification criterion is 1 year of wage income within the 
last year (or within the last three years for high incomes). Sick or maternity leave also count as wage income.  
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marked extension of duration for the great majority of wage earners. Later, duration was 
shortened to the present 104 weeks and 52 weeks, respectively.  
 
Sweden and Finland have not witnessed the Norwegian fluctuations or the Danish cuts in 
benefit duration, but here duration was already considerably lower than in Denmark. Sweden 
has retained its benefit duration of 60 weeks and Finland its own of 100 weeks.  
Denmark, Sweden and Finland have all either abolished or shortened special duration 
extensions for elderly unemployed, however. In all three countries, benefit duration could be in 
practice nearly unlimited before the 1990s since participation in various active labor market 
measures counted as ‘work’ when fulfilling the work requirements. In Denmark, only subsidized 
employment via the ‘job offer’ scheme counted besides ordinary employment, but a cap on the 
number of public job offers (two) was set in 1990, and the 1993-reform meant that subsidized 
employment could no longer be included in the work criterion. In Sweden, by contrast, 
participation in a broad range of ALMP measures could be included in the work criterion (since 
1986), and it was not abolished until 2001. However, Sweden at the same time installed an 
‘activity guarantee’, renamed ‘job and development guarantee’ in 2007, during which one 
receives a lower gross replacement rate of 65% after the ordinary unemployment benefit has 
been exhausted (Berglund & Esser 2013; Sjöberg 2011). Duration of this ‘guarantee’ on lower 
benefits is in principle limited to 90 weeks, and the guarantee is divided into various faced 
during which one participates in different ALMP-measures. If no job is found after 90 weeks, 
one has the right to be placed with an employer. Finland has not completely removed ALMP-
measures from the work criterion, and half of the hours worked in a publicly subsidized job are 
counted as work (AK Samvirke 2012).  
 
The work requirements themselves are of course also important for coverage of unemployment 
insurance. All the Nordic countries have in various ways limited coverage in this way. Norway is 
a bit special in this regard, since the work criterion has always been defined by minimum 
income level, making it more of an income criterion than a work criterion. In 1989, this was 
raised from an income of 0.75 to 1.25 times the ‘base amount’ within the last year (Clasen et. 
al. 2001). This barred very low incomes such as students or elderly women in seasonal work 
from the benefit (as would probably also be the case if a work criterion had been in place). This 
has later been raised to 1.5 times the base amount (which is still very low). In Denmark, the 
work requirement was doubled from 26 weeks to 52 weeks of employment within the last 
three years in 1995, and the aforementioned2010-reform also doubled the requalification 
requirement to 52 weeks (from 2012). This makes the Danish work criteria by far the most 
restrictive among the Nordic Ghent systems, since the work criteria in both Sweden and Finland 
are less than a full year, and furthermore, a ‘work week’ is equivalent to full-time employment 
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in Denmark, but not In Sweden and Finland (ibid.)8. However, it should also be noted that the 
Danish work requirements can be fulfilled three years, while it is one year in the two other 
countries. In Finland, the work requirement was raised from 26 to 43 weeks of part time 
employment in 1997, but the requirement could be fulfilled within the previous 24 months 
rather than the 8 months before (Lilja & Savaja 1999). This was later reduced to the present 34 
weeks within 48 weeks. In Sweden, work requirements were also strengthened, but the period 
during which the requirement could be fulfilled was also extended, and the consequences for 
coverage were relatively marginal (Sjöberg 2011)9. Other factors, such as restricting access for 
students as new entrants into the labor market, had a larger impact.     
     
In Sweden, a 2007-reform which sharply increased and differentiated member contributions, 
causing members to opt out of funds, was a more important factor behind declining coverage. 
Member contributions were tripled and state contributions somewhat disconnected from ‘the 
marginal risk of unemployment’, which meant that membership contributions increased the 
most in funds with high unemployment (Berglund & Esser 2013; Sjöberg 2011). This 
differentiation was further increased in 2008, and about half a million members left the funds 
in 2007-2008 (Goul Andersen 2012). The difference in contributions between funds had 
increased from 4 EUR/month to 41 EUR/month in 2012 (IAF 2013). Overall, member 
contributions soared to constitute 59% of benefits in 2008, up from 12% in 2007 (ibid). The 
government tried to offset this with a small decrease in contributions in 2009, which brought 
the figure down to just below 40%. Denmark has also seen an increase in member financing, 
but there it has not been as abrupt, and more importantly, differentiation between funds has 
not been adopted. Member contributions were openly raised in the 1980s, and less visibly so by 
a 1998 reform which separated contributions to early retirement from contributions towards 
unemployment insurance. Because of very low unemployment, the Danish government actually 
profited from member contributions in 2008 (in other words, member financing was above 
100% (Goul Andersen 2012). Another hidden measure, which has been utilized in both Sweden 
and Denmark, is lowering or abolishing tax deductions on contributions. In Denmark, 
contributions had been fully tax deductible, but the value of deductions was reduced to 33% in 
1998 and 25% in 2009 as elements of larger tax reforms (ibid.). The Social Democratic-led 
government raised it again from 2015, however. The tax deduction had been 40% in Sweden, 
but it was abolished completely with the 2007-reform.  
 
                                                          
8 Denmark: 52 weeks at 37 hours = 1924 hours (within three years). Finland: 34 weeks at 18 hours = 612 hours 
(within 48 weeks). Sweden = 26 weeks at 80 hours (within 12 months) or 480 hours in 26 consecutive weeks 
(within 6 months): 480 hours.  
9 Work requirement was raised from 225 hours (within 4 months) to 480 hours (within 6 or 12 months as explained 
in the note above).  
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The open and hidden measures of increasing member financing appear to have had significant 
effects upon fund membership only in Sweden as an effect of the radical 2007-reform. The 
Swedish government announced its decision to abolish the differentiated membership fees 
from 2013, but the damage had been done in terms of fund membership. In just two years, 
from 2006 to 2008, fund membership in Sweden decreased from 83% to 70% of the workforce 
(AK Samvirke 2012). The membership rate is a few percentage points higher in Denmark and 
about 75% in Finland.  
  
An important element behind the traditionally high coverage of unemployment insurance has 
been a strong linkage in the Nordic Ghent countries between being a member of the trade 
union and its corresponding unemployment fund. This has been seen as the main explanation 
for very high trade union membership rates in Denmark, Finland and Sweden (Høgedahl 2014; 
Lind 2009; Rothstein 1992). However, fund membership and trade union membership is not the 
same thing, a fact which has become even more pronounced in all three countries. Trade union 
membership peaked in the mid-1990s at 80% in Denmark and Finland and 89% in Sweden, but 
had by 2009 declined to just below 70% in all three countries where it seems to have stabilized 
(OECD 2014b; Böckermann & Uusitalo 2006). In Norway, where unemployment insurance is 
compulsory, trade union density has been stable around 55%, still a wide margin above the 15-
35% in most other Western countries. In Sweden and Finland, fund membership has to some 
extent been de-coupled from trade union membership when union-independent 
unemployment funds were set up in 1998 and 1992, respectively, while Denmark in 2002 
passed legislation which allowed for cross-trade unemployment funds. 
 
In all three countries, the development is a serious challenge to traditional, trade-based unions. 
Other factors are at play too, such as the changing composition of the labor force (fewer blue 
collar workers) and the steep membership decline among young age cohorts. The declining 
generosity of benefits (and the steep increase in member contributions in Sweden) is important 
too.  However, the main explanation behind declining trade union membership seems to be the 
new funds independent of traditional trade unions (Lind 2009). For example, Böckermann & 
Uusitalo (2006) find that the new General Unemployment Fund from 1992 is the main 
explanation in Finland after controlling for the effect other factors, such as changing labor force 
composition, unemployment risk or cohort effects (lower membership among younger 
generations).  
 
Social assistance: The residual nook of Nordic welfare 
In terms of social rights for the unemployed, social assistance or minimum income protection 
for those not member of an unemployment fund is of course important, and has become 
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increasingly important as coverage of insurance has declined. Some retrenchment has also 
taken place here, however.   
 
A national social assistance law as the heir to the old and extremely stigmatizing Poor Law was 
first enacted in Denmark in 1933. Finland, Norway and Sweden followed suit later with national 
legislation after World War II in 1956-1965. To cut short the historical account, the Nordic social 
assistance schemes all evolved from schemes with very high discretion for local municipal 
governments to define eligibility and benefit levels, a trait which continued even as they 
became inscribed in national legislation (Kuivalainen & Nelson 2012; Bahle et. al. 2011). Nordic 
social assistance was often characterized as more residual relative to other countries, which 
perhaps should be seen as a consequence of the very limited needs that needed to be covered 
(Lødemel 1997). As poverty was low and the coverage of unemployment insurance high, there 
simply was a smaller clientele for these benefits in the Nordic countries. As the universal 
welfare states had matured, social assistance was perhaps the last scheme to see steps towards 
a more rights-based approach. Finland was seen as a Nordic forerunner when it set national 
standards for benefit levels from 1989, while Denmark followed soon after and Sweden set a 
national standard in 1998 (Kuivalainen & Nelson 2012). Norway introduced guidelines in 2001, 
but substantial local discretion remains (Gubrium & Lødemel 2014; Kuivalainen & Nelson 2012). 
This means that Denmark has the most rights-based social assistance scheme since benefit 
levels are completely fixed at the national level, while Finland and Sweden have lower national 
base levels of social assistance supplemented by a range of variable and additional supplements 
depending on the costs of living of the individual recipient (Bahle et. al. 2011)   
       
 In this regard, it should be noted that Finland and Sweden have an extra benefit tier besides 
social assistance, where those who fulfill the work criteria for unemployment insurance, but are 
not fund members can receive a flat-rate benefit which is not means-tested. Sweden 
introduced this benefit tier in 1974 and Finland did the same in 1994 (Sjöberg 2011; Lilja & 
Savaja 2001). Before 1994, the Finnish scheme was a means-tested unemployment assistance 
scheme, enacted in 1960, but it became integrated within the unemployment insurance system 
in 1994 and means-test removed as a new means-tested assistance was adopted (Edling 2006; 
Clasen et. al. 2001). Both the Finnish and Swedish unemployment assistance schemes are 
referred to as ‘basic’ unemployment benefits.  
 
While coverage of the Nordic social assistance schemes traditionally used to be quite low, 
mostly due to the well-developed ensemble of income protection in the Nordic countries, 
Nordic social assistance-benefits have usually been described as relatively generous in terms of 
benefit levels (Gough 2001). Today, that notion does not seem to find strong support when 
compared with benefit levels in other European countries (Figari et. al. 2013; Mechelen & 
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Marchal 2013; Bahle et. al. 2011). Benefit levels are difficult to compare across countries, 
particularly in the case of social assistance, because a range of supplementary and discretionary 
elements often play an important role for the total benefit package, but there is no doubt that 
social assistance has become less generous over time in the Nordic countries. Kuivalainen & 
Nelson (2012) utilize Nelson’s own dataset on social assistance, and find that the equivalized 
disposaple income of recipients on social assistance compared the average wage earner 
dropped from 57% to 48% in Denmark, from 62% to 50% in Finland, and from 65% to 44% in 
Sweden, while Norwegian benefit levels have been stable around 45% in 1990-2008.   
     
In Sweden, municipalities began excluding some of the items included in national guidelines on 
benefit calculations in the 1990s, and after the standardization of benefit levels in 1998 some 
items were removed from the range of supplementary benefits (ibid.) Finland lowered social 
assistance benefits in 1998, and a self-liability portion of housing costs were also adopted for 
housing benefits, but this measure was abolished again in 2006. In Denmark, the introduction 
of taxation for income benefits in 1994 was not fully compensated for single people and single 
parents, just as housing benefits also became less generous (ibid). Denmark from 2002 and 
onwards introduced measures like a ceiling for social assistance and a work requirement for 
couples on social assistance, where one partner could completely loose entitlements (Goul 
Andersen & Pedersen 2007). Another 2002-reform also contained a ‘start assistance’, which 
primarily affected immigrants and entailed significantly reduced benefits, but all of these 
measures from 2002 were abolished again in 2011 by the new Social Democratic-led 
government. Denmark has also introduced much lower social assistance for young recipients, 
which has gradually been extended to cover all able-bodied youths below 30 years.   
 
Of great importance over the long run is of course the issue of indexation of benefits. The 
national benefit levels in Sweden and Finland are regulated only according to the price 
development, while the Danish indexation method is tied to the wage development 
(Kuivalainen & Nelson 2012). As regards the aforementioned unemployment assistance scheme 
in Sweden, today known as ‘basic unemployment benefits’, indexation was also frozen from the 
early 1990’s and even lowered a few times (Clasen et. al. 2001). While the Danish indexation is 
more generous, it does have a hidden under-compensation, except in times of low economic 
growth as explained before on unemployment insurance. The method of indexation is the same 
for the two benefits in Denmark. 
 
Health care: Decentralized universalism  
Among the different models or configurations of health care, the Nordic countries are all 
characterized by universalism, where both financing, provision and regulation of health care is a 
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public responsibility (Böhm et. al. 2013; Wendt et. al. 2009). In terms of spending, the Nordic 
countries are among the countries with the highest levels of public spending and the highest 
share of public spending relative to total health expenditure (this has not applied to Finland 
since the 1990’s, however) (OECD 2014c). In most recent years, 81-85% of health expenditure 
has been public (Finland 75%; EU 27-average 73%), and public spending amounted to 8-9% of 
GDP (Finland 6.6%; EU 27-average 6.5%). The greatest share of the non-public expenditure 
comes in the form of user-charges or fees for public health care or out-of-pocket payments for 
pharmaceuticals, especially in Finland, Norway and Sweden. Unlike the other countries, 
Denmark has no fees for treatment from general practitioners or hospitals, while total self-
financing of dental care (except for limited reimbursements for the poorest) dominates in 
Denmark.      
 
Universal and relatively generous health care is not at all exclusive to the Nordic countries. As 
an example, the British National Health Service (NHS) has long been known as a quintessential 
example of universal health care. Other country cases could also be named. What has been 
distinctly Nordic, however, is the degree to which local government (municipalities or counties) 
has been responsible for health care with some degree of state funding (Magnussen et. al. 
2009; Byrkjeflot & Neby 2004). However, as we will see later, there have been some trends 
towards centralization in the new millennium.  
 
Decentralization of public health care was a strong trait in the Nordic health systems even 
before they arrived at fully fledged universalism (Haave 2006). Historically, the Nordic countries 
were relatively hospital-centered in terms of hospital shares of total spending and health 
personnel (Haave 2006; Byrkjeflot & Neby 2004). In the three Scandinavian countries only a 
very small number of public hospitals were state owned (and managed by local-level 
government instead), while a relatively large share of the Finnish hospitals were state-owned 
until the 1950s (Vuorenkoski 2008). Responsibility for hospitals was later placed at the 
municipal level in Finland. The Hospital Act of 1990 brought all municipal hospitals under the 
management of 21 larger health care districts (Häkkinen 2005). They did not constitute a 
separate administrative county or regional-level body, but Finnish municipalities cooperated 
together in these hospital districts or ‘hospital federations’ to secure the necessary population 
base for specialized services. In Denmark, local responsibility for hospitals was established in a 
royal decree from 1806, long before the expansion of the hospital network to nearly every 
town. The hospital act of 1969 placed responsibility at the county level. After a period of state 
ownership, Sweden switched to the county level in the 1860s after the counties had been 
established in 1862. It was not until 1928 that hospital care became a legal obligation for the 
counties, however. Norway built a number of county-level hospitals after World War II, which 
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coexisted alongside the older municipal facilities, before transferring these to the county level 
in the 1960s.  
 
Unlike most non-Nordic countries with universal health care such as Britain, the Nordic 
countries (except for Norway) did not arrive at universalism after switching from a primarily 
social insurance-based model. Social insurance played only a minor role for specialized or 
inpatient treatment (Haave 2006). Norway introduced compulsory sickness insurance in 1909 
(coverage was not universal or population-wide until 1957), which provided both medical and 
cash benefits. The other early Nordic schemes primarily aimed at providing income support and 
a few medical benefits in kind. Here, inpatient treatment at hospitals was primarily funded 
through public budgets, and social insurance only played a minor role. Denmark and Sweden 
introduced voluntary, state-supported sickness insurance-acts in the 1890s.     
  
 
While insurance had played only a minor role in hospital care (except for Norway), it did, 
however, play a large role in terms of primary care, especially in Denmark (Martinussen & 
Magnussen 2009). Besides Norway, the Danish development is closest to resembling a switch 
from a social insurance-model to universal, national health care. However, since insurance was 
heavily regulated and healthcare provision was heavily hospital-centered in Denmark as in the 
other Nordic countries, financing and provision has been primarily public since the late 19th 
century (Wendt et. al. 2009).  
 
In Denmark, sickness insurance funds sprang up first from craftsmen’s guilds in the second half 
of the 1800s, which later spread to other group of laborers (Vallgårda & Krasnik 2010, 1999). 
The formation of sickness funds is also one reason why Denmark relatively early had such a 
well-developed coverage of local physicians or doctors compared to the other Nordic countries 
(Vallgårda & Krasnik 1999). Denmark began publicly subsidizing sickness funds in 1892, and the 
social reform of 1933 in also made membership compulsory (in order to be eligible for old-age 
support) for people below a certain income level (Vallgårda & Krasnik 2010). In Denmark, 
Coverage of sickness insurance was extended to all wage earners in 1960, and the system which 
had hitherto aimed at ‘excluding the rich’ from primary care, having been in place since state-
subsidization began in 1982, was abolished (Petersen 2012).  From 1973, the sickness funds 
were abolished, and the counties assumed responsibility for financing, regulation and providing 
both primary and secondary health care. The sickness fund ‘Danmark’ survived, however, and 
continues to ensure members against medical expenses not covered by public health care 
(membership stood at more than 2.2. million in 2012), such as pharmaceuticals or dental care.  
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In Sweden, the most important final step towards universalization beyond compulsory sickness 
insurance in 1955 was the so-called “Seven Crown Reform” of 1970. Not only did it firmly place 
all kinds of specialized care (it had only been hospitals up to that point) at the county level, but 
it made health care much more accessible to low-income groups with the state reimbursing the 
expenses of counties (Byrkjeflot & Neby 2004).  
 
Norway as noted earlier made its compulsory insurance fully universal in 1957, but the final 
step towards the modern, universal health system came in 1967 when the country set up its 
National Insurance Scheme in 1967 (Johnsen 2006; Kuhnle 1987). From 1971, health insurance 
was also integrated within the scheme, and sickness insurance was included in general taxation, 
where it became visible as a ‘health tax’ (Haave 2006).  
 
Finland was the last European country to legislate compulsory sickness insurance in 1963. In the 
Finnish case, the universal-coverage act of 1963 did not eliminate inequalities in access to 
health care since so much depended on the resources of local municipalities.  The state in the 
1970s assumed a much stronger role in terms of financing and initiated the construction of new 
facilities (Kangas & Saloniemi 2013; Vuorenkoski 2008). The Primary Health Care act of 1972 
laid out the foundations for the present-day system of municipal health centres.  
 
Reinforcing the supplementary role of private health care 
The universalization of health care never completely crowded out the private sector. In primary 
care, general practitioners (GP’s) as gatekeepers to specialized treatment are often self-
employed, but publicly funded. In Denmark, a legacy from the sickness funds and their well-
developed network of primary care mentioned above has been that GPs remained outside 
formal public ownership after the 1973-reform, even if their services became completely tax-
financed.   
 
In Sweden, by contrast, the aforementioned “Seven Crown Reform” of 1970 gave further push 
to the trend of physicians becoming salaried employees of local counties (Byrkjeflot & Neby 
2004). From 1994, however, the Family Doctor Act and the Act on Freedom to Establish Private 
Practice enabled general practitioners to become independent or more specifically revoked the 
counties’ regulations on the number of private practitioners and also gave citizens freedom to 
freely choose their own GPs (Martinussen & Magnussen 2009). Even though the reforms were 
quickly withdrawn when the Social Democrats re-entered government office, many counties 
had already implemented them. A new Freedom of Choice-act entered into force in 2010, 
which obliged counties to allow for citizens to choose between primary care-providers, with 
reimbursements following the citizen regardless of public or private ownership (Anell et. al. 
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2012; Nordgren & Ahgren 2011; Häkkinen & Jonsson 2009). By 2011, about 40% of all doctor 
visits were provided by private GPs.  
 
Norway was inspired by the Danish organization of GPs when it passed a reform of primary 
health care in 2001 (Hagen & Vrangbæk 2009; Martinussen & Magnussen 2009). Aiming to 
reduce turnover among GPs and to induce more stability in the GP-relationship, the reform 
meant that every citizen became listed with a specific GP as in Denmark and about 90% of GPs 
in the following years chose to become self-employed.  
 
Finland generally retained its system of publicly owned health centers in primary care at the 
municipal level, but some municipalities have contracted out the management of health 
centres to private providers (Saltman & Vrangbæk 2009). Private leasing of physicians to public 
health centres has also been a new trend in Finland (Martinussen & Magnussen 2009). While 
contracting out has not been prevalent, the private sector has long had a strong supplementary 
role in Finland, especially in primary care. In terms of both expenditure and employment, the 
non-public sector has grown much faster than the public since the 1990’s (we will return to this 
below).   
 
In terms of hospital care, the role of private providers remains very modest. In all the 
Scandinavian countries, around 90% or more of patients receive care at public hospitals 
(Martinussen & Magnussen 2009). The role of private providers has certainly grown. Much of it 
is a result of increasing patients rights’ legislation coupled with free choice between public and 
private providers (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2013; Anell et. al. 2012; Tynkkynen 2009; 
Winblad & Ringaard 2009). While all the Nordic countries have extended patients’ rights and 
introduced waiting time guarantees, general free choice for patients between public and 
private hospital care at the national level has only been introduced in Denmark and Norway, 
while Sweden has introduced free choice within counties, adapted and implemented by 
counties themselves (Anell et. al. 2012; Hem et. al. 2011). Free choice of general practicioners 
in primary care has been expanded and legislated at the country-level in all three Scandinavian 
countries. Finland has also introduced choice at the national level for all forms of care, but only 
for health care provided by municipalities, which may or may not be private. Free choice 
between public and private only applies to statutory occupational health care.   
 
In Denmark, the use of private hospitals has been curtailed somewhat by means of fewer 
referrals for private treatment and lower public subsidies. Therefore, while their share of 
patients is higher, private treatment with public funding had declined to only 1.25% of 
expenditure in 2012 (CEPOS 2013). The role of private hospitals in Norway increased with a 
2002-reform, which we will return to below. The reform caused the use of private treatment to 
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triple in 2002-2005 (from a very low point of departure), but this was later curtailed somewhat 
by the new centre-left government (Saltman & Vrangbæk 2009). In Finland, private care is 
reimbursed by the national Social Insurance Institution (formally 30%, but usually somewhat 
less) (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2013; Häkkinen & Jonsson 2009; Saltman & 
Vrangbæk 2009; Wahlbeck et. al. 2008). However, partly spurred by occupational insurance 
(where reimbursements are higher, which we will return to below) and municipal contracting 
out, private providers have come to play a more significant role in hospital care. While private 
treatment has expanded by means of insurance, contracts or waiting list guarantees in 
Denmark, Finland and Norway, the issue has been more politicized in Sweden (Berglund & Esser 
2013; Häkkinen & Jonsson 2009). Two local counties (Stockholm and Scania) run by right-wing 
local governments directly sold one public emergency hospital and several more were prepared 
for privatization in the late 1990s, but the Social Democrat government enacted a ban on 
further contracting out of hospitals from 2001. The centre-right government coalition from 
2006 later overturned some restrictions in this regard.  
 
Private health insurance has as hinted just above come to play a larger role in all the Nordic 
countries, but can so far be regarded as a rather modest and supplementary layer on top of the 
universal health systems. The expansion of private health insurance coverage has been most 
prominent by far in Denmark (Berge & Hyggen 2010; Martinussen & Magnussen 2009). One 
important push for this happened in 2002, when the liberal-conservative government 
introduced tax subsidies for private health insurance provided by employers under the 
condition that coverage included all employees and not just specific employee-groups (Beland 
et. al. 2014; Kjellberg et. al. 2010). The new centre-left government abandoned tax subsidies 
again in 2011, but coverage of private insurance has continued to expand. By 2012, just below 2 
million Danes were covered by private health insurance in some form (Forsikring & Pension 
2014). While this presents an extreme development in terms of coverage, it does not mean that 
one-third of the population (almost exclusively people in employment) has quit public health 
care. The revenues of the small private sector is still overwhelmingly coming from publicly 
funded patients referred because of waiting list guarantees, free choice, etc, and insurance-
covered or self-paying patients constitute a small minority (Kjellberg et. al. 2010). No doubt, an 
important factor behind the Danish development is the way in which supplementary insurance 
has become a normal part of the employment package for job holders just as supplementary 
unemployment insurance now is in Sweden as noted earlier. The difference is that the Swedish 
private unemployment insurance has become a part of collective agreements, while it has 
taken place at the firm-level in Denmark.  
 
In the other Scandinavian countries, the development is far less pronounced. In Norway, 
333.000 Norwegians, or a little less than 7% of the population, had some form of private 
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insurance in 2012, while the figures for Sweden were 464.000 or just below 5% of the 
population in 2011 (SKL 2012; Manifest Analyse 2012). As in Denmark, the vast majority of 
these are covered through their employer, so coverage among the employed is much higher. 
Unlike Denmark, however, the development is not spurred by legislation or tax deductions. In 
Norway, insurance drawn up by employers were tax deductible from 2003, but this was 
repealed again by the new Social Democrat government in 2006 (Berge & Hyggen 2010).  
   
Finland is a Nordic peculiarity in this regard since occupational health insurance is statutory 
(Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2013; Wahlbeck et. al. 2008).  Employers in Finland are 
required to offer free occupational healthcare for their employees. Coverage is around 85-90% 
of employees since not all small enterprises are enrolled while participation is voluntary for 
farmers and self-employed. Occupational health care is subsidized by the aforementioned 
Social Insurance Institution by 50-60 %, while there is a corporate tax deduction for the 
remaining 45% (Saltman & Vrangbæk 2009; Wahlbeck et. al. 2008). In terms of provision, 
employers can choose between either setting up their own, buying from other employers, 
purchasing from municipal health centres or from private providers. Only a small minority of 
occupational insurance is provided by municipal health centres, and the increasing utilization of 
occupational health insurance in primary care has fuelled the growth in non-public health care 
delivery mentioned above (Wahlbeck et. al. 2008). The most important reasons for this 
development is shorter waiting times in occupational health care and access to a broader 
spectrum of treatment. This has led to significant inequalities in health care utilization in 
Finland. In 2000, Finland was found be among the OECD-countries with the greatest pro-rich 
inequality in doctor visits along with Portugal and the United States (Kangas & Saloniemi 2013; 
Wahlbeck et. al. 2008). The Occupational Health Care Act came into effect in 1979, but its effect 
has been more keenly felt in more recent decades as the perception of insufficient staffing or 
too long waiting times in municipal health care became more widespread. In that sense, the 
Finnish development seems so far to have had more significant consequences regarding the 
crowding-in of non-public health care than has the recent Danish expansion of private health 
insurance for employees. In addition, private health insurance has also bloomed in Finland. In 
2012, around 1 million Finns (or 20% of the population) have private insurance, with about half 
of them being drawn up by parents who wish to cover their children (Kangas & Saloniemi 2013). 
All told, the private sector accounted for 25% of expenditures and 20% of personnel in health 
care provision in 2009 (Arajärvi & Väyrynen 2011). This substantiates how health care in Finland 
is significantly less ‘public’ than in the other Nordic countries, as mentioned in the beginning. 
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Introducing market mechanisms in public health care 
The organization and regulation of public health care has also been changed significantly. As 
mentioned in the beginning, a very distinct Nordic trait has been the decentralized provision of 
health care. Particularly Norway and Denmark adopted reforms in the new millennium which 
raises the question of whether the decentralized Nordic path has been challenged or perhaps 
even abandoned (Byrkjeflot & Neby 2004).  
 
A 2002-reform in Norway transferred hospital and other forms of specialist care from 19 
counties to the state, with health care provision being organized by five (later four) regional 
health enterprises under the Ministry of Health (Hippe & Berge 2013; Martinussen & 
Magnussen 2009; Byrkjeflot & Neby 2004). With the main idea being that hospitals should act 
more like private enterprises, they were restructured into semi-independent public firms.  
 
Similarly, Denmark from 2007 implemented a structural reform which reduced the number of 
local authorities from 14 counties to 5 regions and from 275 municipalities to 98 (Martinussen 
& Magnussen 2009). The new and larger regions retained their responsibility for health care, 
but the most important change in the reform was that the authority to set independent tax 
rates was removed from the new regions. Instead, financing has largely become a matter for 
the central government, with only a small share of reimbursements coming from municipalities. 
Fiscal centralization also characterized the Norwegian reform, but while counties already were 
very limited in setting tax rates before the 2002-reform, the Norwegian reform further replaced 
unconditional block grants from the government with conditional and activity-based funding 
(Rehnberg et. al. 2009; Häkkinen 2005).        
   
Similar attempts at centralization have been attempted in both Sweden and Finland, however. 
In these two countries, it was until recently more of a coordinated bottom-up process rather 
than the big-bang, top-down reforms of Denmark and Norway. Sweden tried to initiate a 
process of voluntary mergers over several years after a structural reform commission handed in 
its report in 2007 (Martinussen & Magnussen 2009). The process collapsed in 2012, however, as 
no counties managed to present any final mergers to the government (Karlsson & Bretzer 
2012). A similar process of mergers has been more successful in Finland, but here it has taken 
place at the municipal level (where health care responsibility has hitherto been placed). The 
Finnish government began subsidizing municipal mergers already in 2002, but the central 
government adopted a skeleton law in 2007 to increase reform impetus, which aimed for a 
minimum municipal size of 20.000 inhabitants (Blöchliger & Vammalle 2012; Häkkinen & 
Jonsson 2009). Financial incentives for mergers ended in 2013, but the process is on-going. 
Between 2001 and 2014, the number of municipalities was reduced from 452 to 320 
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(Population Register Center of Finland 2014; Blöchliger & Vammalle 2012).  Finally, by late 2014 
a new health care reform was agreed upon by the government coalition, which when 
implemented will place responsibility for all forms of health care in new regional units (the 
‘SOTE-reform’) 
 
Sweden has led the charge on other aspects of public health care reform, however. Many of 
these have had the aim of introducing market-mechanisms internally in the public sector, often 
described under the heading of New Public Management (NPM). Inspired by similar British 
efforts, a number of Swedish counties in the beginning of the 1990s introduced the purchaser-
provider model (PPM), where political steering and professional provision of health care is 
separated to a higher degree (hence the split between purchasers and providers) (Martinussen 
& Magnussen 2009; Haave 2006). The aim is to promote competition between providers. This 
of course demanded increased contract-based relationships and increased use of activity-based 
funding between the separate bodies in terms of financial allocation. Half of the counties had 
adopted the model by 1994, but optimism changed to skepticism later (Martinussen & 
Magnussen 2009; Byrkjeflot & Neby 2004). PPM and activity-based funding therefore 
increasingly became accompanied by price or volume ceilings as well as quality standards. The 
use of PPM did not expand the role of private provision very much.  
 
Norway followed suit with PPM around the same time as Sweden, but the extent was less 
significant and the process slower. By 2004, only 30% of municipalities had introduced PPM-
models in primary care (Martinussen & Magnussen 2009). The 2002-reform in essence 
introduced some form of PPM-split in hospital care when it shifted hospitals from the county to 
the state-level, but with hospitals as independent ‘health enterprises’. Activity based funding, 
however, was implemented nationally from 1997 for hospital services based on national 
standards for fees and reimbursements (ibid.). Hence the much lower share of unconditional 
block grants in Norway mentioned above.  
 
Denmark did not introduce the formal split of the PPM-model, but the use of internal, contract-
based financial allocation became widespread in the new millennium. Like Norway, it happened 
as a push from above, but in the Danish case it was through agreements with the central 
government which defined how large a share of funding should be activity-based. Therefore, 
Sweden may have ushered in the trend of activity-based funding, but it became much more 
utilized in both Denmark and Norway, while the trend grinded to a halt in Sweden (Rehnberg 
et. al. 2009). In Finland, the use of PPM spread to a significant minority of municipalities later in 
the new millennium even though PPM was legalized already in 1993 (Tynkkynen 2009). 
However, Finland in many ways already had strong traits of PPM with its organization of 
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municipalities as purchasers of services together in hospital districts (Martinussen & 
Magnussen 2009).  
 
Conclusion 
The Nordic ‘model’ or welfare regime has perhaps always been easiest to identify on a range of 
socio-economic outcomes such as relatively low inequality, low poverty rates, low material 
deprivation and high social cohesion, both in terms of participation and social trust. When we 
focus solely on the welfare state, the picture is decidedly more mixed. Sometimes, the Nordic 
model has been described as a model with five exceptions (including Iceland), or as an ideal in 
the minds Nordic people (Petersen 2011; Cox 2004). However, some commonalities regarding 
policy institutions are identifiable, many of which have been mentioned above. These countries 
were much closer than elsewhere to archetypal social policy universalism with Finland as the 
borderline case or universal/conservative hybrid. Nordic universalism has been no frozen 
landscape, however, and here we have tracked the most important changes in the policy fields 
of pensions, health care and unemployment protection.  
 
Health care universalism endures, where the private sector to a large extent can be said to have 
been consolidated as a supplement. The still limited private sector has primarily grown as an 
institutionalized element within universal, tax-financed welfare, and less so as an isolated 
playground for private health insurance. Once again, Finland is the exception. Private insurance 
has increased dramatically in Denmark, but so far it has not changed the role of the public 
sector significantly, even if it may do so in the future.  
 
In the field of pensions, reforms have been transformative and to a large extent abandoned 
universalism in principle. Universal pensions have given way to earnings-related public pensions 
or labor market pensions. In Denmark, the public people’s pension still has an element of ideal-
typical universalism. However, minimum benefit levels for those reliant on public basic 
pensions are still relatively high in all the countries.  Denmark and Finland has not incorporated 
earnings-related pensions into the public pension system as in Norway and Sweden, but 
coverage of private labor market pensions is quasi-universal if sectorally divided.  
 
Clear-cut retrenchment is visible within unemployment protection. Benefit levels in 
unemployment insurance and social assistance has declined, most significantly in Sweden. The 
coverage of unemployment benefits was already relatively moderate in Finland, while it has 
declined in Sweden due to reforms in the new millennium. Denmark has continuously cut down 
on benefit duration and restricted access to benefits, but it has not had a major impact on 
coverage until recently.  
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The three policy fields selected here are illustrative examples of the main trends uncovered in 
recent comparative welfare state research. The Nordic countries continue to be most distinct in 
welfare services and especially care policies, even if non-Nordic Europe to some extent has 
converged towards the Nordic countries, especially in family policies. As regards income 
transfers for the working-age population we see some of the most significant changes and real 
steps towards de-universalization. Here, the Nordic welfare states have been subject to some 
of the same trends that can be identified in most of Europe.  
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